University of Richmond Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 2

Article 7

1999

Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause
Andrew Koppelman

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 393 (1999).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School Journals at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Richmond Law Review by an authorized editor of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.

AKHIL AMAR AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Andrew Koppelman*
Does Akhil Amar's The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction ("The Bill of Rights") say anything about what the law
should be today? The answer is not clear. The book is a study
of the original meaning of the Bill of Rights and the transformation of that meaning by the Fourteenth Amendment.' Its
project is archaeological rather than prescriptive. It focuses on
what the Constitution meant in 1791 and in 1866, not what it
means now. Amar acknowledges that he has "merely set the
scene"2 for an investigation into what impact twentieth-century
(textual and other) developments have had on Constitutional
Law. Steven Calabresi has thus concluded that The Bill
of
3
Rights "has few obvious immediate doctrinal implications."
Yet the book implicitly criticizes existing doctrine as based on
an inadequate understanding of the Bill. It attacks the intellectual foundations of the doctrine that now prevails in the Supreme Court, and calls for a radical reconstruction of those
foundations. It would be surprising if such a radical reshaping
of the base had no effect on the superstructure.
Amar is sensitive to the radical potential of his investigations, and so, in Chapter 11 of the book (entitled "Reconstructing Rights"), he attempts to show that, upon the more solid

* Assistant Professor of Law and Political Science, Northwestern University.

Akhil Amar taught me constitutional law when I was a first year student (and he
was a first year professor) at Yale Law School in 1985. He has been characteristically
generous in helping me develop the arguments laid out herein. This essay is affectionately dedicated to him.
1. Space does not allow me to enumerate the book's virtues here, but I incorporate by reference and join in Steven Calabresi's lengthy encomium in We are all
Federalists, We are all Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the Fourteenth Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 1999) (reviewing AxHIL REED AmAR, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)).
2. AKEIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 299

(1998).
3. Calabresi, supra note 1 (manuscript at 23, on file with author).
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foundation he has laid, one may erect an edifice that looks
quite a lot like the law that currently exists. Amar reassures us
that his account would not entail any significant dilution of our
liberties: "I have told a tale that, at the end of the day, ends
up supporting most of today's precedent about the Bill of
Rights."4 While most of the book eschews evaluation of present
doctrine, this is not true of the concluding sentence: "From
start to finish this book has aimed to explain how today's judges and lawyers have often gotten it right without quite realizing why."5
This comforting vision recalls T.S. Eliot's famous lines:
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.6
However, the conclusions of Amar's chapter on reconstructing
rights are not tightly bound to the rest of the book. "As with
any general framework," he acknowledges, "my model might
yield different results if worked by another hand."7
It appears to me that, in some important respects, his model
has implications that are subversive rather than approving of
existing doctrine. Those implications would carry the law in
directions that neither Amar nor I find attractive. As one looks
at these implications closely, the literary model that suggests itself is not Eliot's newly self-aware homecoming, but Ray
Bradbury's tale of travelers who think that they have been
reunited with their families only to discover too late that they
are on Mars, and that Mars isn't a nice place.8
My worry about Amar's theory is that, while it promises to
show us a new and more secure path home, it may instead, if
accepted without modification, lead us to spend the rest of our
lives on Mars.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

AMAR, supra note 2, at 307.
Id.
T.S. ELiOT, Little Gidding, in FOUR QUARTETS (1942).
AMAR, supra note 2, at 231.
See RAY BRADBRY, THE MARTIAN CHRONICLES 32-48 (1951).
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I begin at home, with where the law is now. I will focus on
the Establishment Clause, because that is where Amar's theory
seems to me to have the most mischievous implications. The
Supreme Court has held much of the Bill of Rights to be a
constraint upon the states, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Working from that premise, more than half a century ago
the Court, in Everson v. Board of Education, announced the
following truisms of contemporary constitutional law:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or nonattendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be
levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever from they may
adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the
Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in
the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a wall of
separation between Church and State."9
Most of what the Supreme Court said in 1947 in Everson has
become an unquestioned part of constitutional doctrine today-most, but not all; some of the language I have just quoted
has produced controversial results. For example, the Court
(unpersuasively) interpreted the prohibition on laws that "aid
all religions" to mean that government must discriminate
against religion when it provides generally available programs
of assistance, for example, to private schools.' ° But these results cannot fairly be blamed on Everson, which upheld public
funding of transportation of students to both public and parochial schools." The Court also attempted, for some decades, to
9. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citations omitted).
10. See Michael W. McConnell, The Selective Funding Problem: Abortions and
Religious Schools, 104 HARV. L. RV. 989, 991 (1991).
11. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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derive a rule of law from Jefferson's wall metaphor, but this attempt has now been largely abandoned." These, however, are
details. Even those who are least sympathetic to separationism
have not been inclined to question most of the rules laid down
3
by the Court in Everson."
The Bill of Rights has only a few pages that deal with the
establishment question. Those pages are, however, radical in
their implications-far more radical than even Amar recognizes.
For many years, interpreters of the U.S. Constitution have
debated whether, and to what extent, the guarantees of the Bill
of Rights constrain state governments. Those guarantees originally only applied to the federal government, but after the Civil
War, the question arose whether the Fourteenth Amendment,
which was expressly directed against the states, applied the Bill
of Rights to state governments.
For some decades, the Court was split between those,
Hugo Black, who urged "total" incorporation, and those,
William Brennan, who urged "selective" incorporation
those rights which were "fundamental." 4 (Everson was

such as
such as
of only
the de-

12. See generally Ira C. Lupu, The Lingering Death of Separationism, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 230 (1994).
13. For instance, Justice Kennedy, who for some time wanted to reinterpret the
Establishment Clause so that it would only prohibit coercion, nonetheless thought
that some symbolic state action went too far. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573, 661 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
concurring with the judgment of the Court in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Kennedy
explained:
Symbolic recognition or accommodation of religious faith may violate the
Clause in an extreme case. I doubt not, for example, that the Clause
forbids a city to permit the permanent erection of a large Latin cross on
the roof of city hall. This is not because government speech about religion is per se suspect, as the majority would have it, but because such
an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the government's
weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a particular
religion.
Id. (footnote omitted).
14. There have also been other views that commanded the support of some Supreme Court justices. Some justices supported incorporation of the entire Bill of
Rights plus some other "fundamental" rights not listed there; some thought that the
Fourteenth Amendment included restrictions very much like, but not identical with,
those contained in some clauses of the Bill of Rights. Another possibility is "no incorporation"-that the rights do not apply against the states at all-but this position
has little support on the Court. See WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 135 (2d ed. 1995).
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cision that incorporated the Establishment Clause into the
Fourteenth Amendment. The majority opinion was written by
Black.) Ultimately, Brennan prevailed, though he reached almost all of the results sought by Black. Today, nearly every
right enumerated in the first eight amendments applies to the
states. 5 All of this was settled in the Supreme Court by the
early 1970s, but scholars kept debating the incorporation question.
Amar's The Bill of Rights offers an original and distinctive
approach to this debate, which he calls "refined incorporation."
By a careful exploration of the debates leading up to the framing of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a careful parsing
of its text, he concludes that the personal rights enumerated in
the Bill of Rights are in fact protected against state intrusion.
But, as against Black's view, he argues that not all of the provisions of the Bill protect personal rights. The right question to
ask, with respect to any particular provision, is "whether the
provision guarantees a privilege or immunity of individual
citizens rather than a right of states or the public at large.""
To support this claim, Amar shows how the Bill of Rights, as
originally understood by its Framers in 1791, was much more
concerned with collective and public rights than with individual
and private ones. The primary purpose of the Bill was to guarantee the rights of the electorate against overbearing and corrupt representatives. It "focused centrally on empowering the
people collectively against government agents following their
own agenda." 1'7 The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment in
the 1860s, on the other hand, had a far more individualistic
view of rights, and their amendment "focused on protecting
minorities against even responsive, representative, majoritarian
government." 8 And it was this conception of rights, as the
rights of individuals, that they incorporated into the Fourteenth
Amendment. This two-step account of the antecedents of incorporation implies a logical limit on incorporation. Some of the

15. The only rights that the Court has not incorporated are the right to keep and
bear arms, the right against quartering soldiers, and the rights to grand and civil juries.
16. AMAR, supra note 2, at xiv.
17. Id. at 215.
18. Id.
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rights in the original 1791 text were not, and could not be,
individual rights, because they were by nature collective. It is
these rights that should not be applied against the states, because it makes no sense to so apply them.
What happens to the Everson rules under this analysis?
Amar concludes that the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment is one of the provisions that is not incorporable
against the states. The argument is simple: As originally written, this Clause "isnot antiestablishment but pro-states' rights;
it is agnostic on the substantive issue of establishment versus
nonestablishment and simply calls for the issue to be decided
locally."' 9 There is simply no way for this provision to be mechanically incorporated against localities, which logically must
take some position on establishments, either having them or
not having them.
This objection to incorporation of the Establishment Clause is
not original with Amar; it has been made before by others,
though Amar's historical scholarship provides it with added
support.20 The value that Amar has added to it is twofold. The
first, already noted, is that he embeds the point in a more
general, and extremely original, theoretical approach to the
incorporation problem. The second is that, unlike his predecessors, he is not content to allow state establishments. He thinks
that the Fourteenth Amendment does prevent establishment,
though not via the straightforward route of incorporation. Rather, state establishments would violate "the animating Fourteenth Amendment ideals of liberty and equality."2"
Here is how Amar would reconstruct the constitutional doctrine. He thinks that any principles of religious liberty that are
not derivable from the Free Exercise Clause can nonetheless be
inferred from "the equal-protection clause (which frowns on
state laws that unjustifiably single out some folks for special
privileges and relegate others to second-class status)."22 Thus,
19. Id.at 34.
20. See STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 17-34 (1995); william C. Porth & Robert P.

George, Trimming the Ivy: A Bicentennial Re-Examination of the Establishment
Clause, 90 W. VA. L. REV. 109, 133-40 (1987).
21. AMAR, supra note 2, at 254.
22. Id. at 254.
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for example, a noncoercive establishment, such as "a simple
state declaration on a state seal proclaiming Utah 'the Mormon
State,'" would be impermissible because it violates "norms of
equal rights and privileges."'
To substantiate this claim, Amar offers the following analogy:
Surely Alabama could not adopt a state motto proclaiming
itself "the White Supremacy State"; such a motto would
offend basic principles of equal citizenship and equal protection. And so a law that proclaimed Utah a Mormon state
should be suspect whether we call this a violation of []
establishment principles, free-exercise principles, equal-protection principles, equal-citizenship principles, or religiousliberty principles. Once we remember that we are not incorporating clauses mechanically but reconstructing rights, we
reach the unsurprising conclusion that our basic touchstones should be the animating Fourteenth Amendment
ideals of liberty and equality.'
At the end of our journey, we have returned home, and know
the place for the first time. We can now see, according to Amar,
that the Court has gotten it right for the wrong reasons. Once
the foundations are cleared up, our liberties will be more secure
than they were before because their intellectual foundations
will be less vulnerable to criticism.
It appears to me, however, that Amar's theory does not lead
us where he thinks it leads, and that if we follow him, we will
end up quite a long way from home. Amar's "Mormon State"
analogy, in the discussion just quoted, does not work. The hypothetical Utah law is not offensive to equality principles in the
same way as the hypothetical Alabama law. There is a problem
with the Utah law, but it is not an equality problem.
The Alabama law declares, in essence, that one subset of its
citizens is intrinsically, congenitally inferior to others-less
worthy of concern and respect, their fates mattering less than
the fates of whites. It partakes of the old idea, closely associat-

23. Id. at 252.
24. Id. at 254 (footnote omitted). The omission from this quote signified by the
brackets is the word "the," which Amar advises me is a typographical error that will
be corrected in future prints of the book.
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ed with slavery, that blacks were "beings of an inferior order,
and altogether unfit to associate with the white race, either in
social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no
rights which the white man was bound to respect ... ."' It is
thus inconsistent with egalitarian ideals that are at the root of
representative democracy-the idea that everyone's vote counts
the same, and that the government owes each citizen equal
concern and respect.26
It would be unfair to describe the Utah law in this way. It
does not presuppose that Mormons are intrinsically superior
human beings; rather, it announces the value of a way of life
that is, in principle, available to anyone. 7 Even if the law is
understood to be a proselytizing law, which seeks to convert everyone to Mormonism, it does not offend against equality." It
does assert the existence of a certain sort of religious truth, but

25. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1857).
26. On the foundational importance of these ideals, see Andrew Koppelman,
Romer v. Evans and Invidious Intent, 6 WM.& MARY BILL RTs. J. 89, 101-03 (1997)
[hereinafter Koppelman, Invidious Intent], and ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SocIAL EQUALITY 13-31 (1996).

27. One might challenge this point on originalist grounds. John Harrison suggests
that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment regarded discrimination on the basis
of religion as similar to racial discrimination. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1461 (1992). On this basis,
one could perhaps argue that even if it is an error to think that equality requires
disestablishment of religion, this error was held by the Framers and so should be
understood to be a rule laid down by the Amendment. Even if one accepted this variety of originalism, the historical claim on which it is based would require a lot more
documentation than Harrison provides. He offers only two snippets from Congressional debates and both postdate the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id.
28. Amar has interpreted the Equal Protection Clause as analogous to the prohibition against ex post facto laws:
Penal laws must punish persons, not for doing something that only later
became legally wrong, but for doing something that was legally wrong
when they did it. Such laws must be prospective, in that they announce
a standard that will be enforced, thereby giving potential miscreants the
opportunity to mend their ways. But many Jim Crow laws were designed
to stigmatize blacks simply for who they were, which was certainly not
something they could change.
Akhil Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation
and Reverse Incorporation,in BENCHMARKS: GREAT CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN

THE SUPREME COURT 71, 80 (Terry Eastland ed., 1995). But the hypothetical Utah
law does not fit this description. I am not a Mormon, but I am sure that, if I decided tomorrow to convert to Mormonism, the Mormons would welcome me with open
arms.
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that truth implies nothing about the relative worth of different
citizens.2 9
There are, of course, objections to the Utah law, resting on
the standard arguments for nonestablishment. One can say that
such laws risk severe and politically destructive religious conflict. One can say that Mormonism itself will be corrupted if it
becomes too cozy with political authorities. One can say that
the law is insufficiently respectful of the conscientious convictions of citizens who are not Mormons. One can say that the
law throws the state's weight on one side of a theological controversy in which it has no particular expertise and in which
its intervention is unlikely to accomplish any good.
But none of these objections have anything to do with equality. You can disdain my beliefs and actions without necessarily

29. Amar's discussion cites with approval Ira Lupus argument that equality principles underlie nonestablishment. See AmAR, supra note 2, at 385 n.95 (citing Ira C.
Lupu, Keeping the Faith:Religion, Equality, and Speech in the U.S. Constitution, 18
CONN. L. REv. 739, 743 (1986)). Lupu argues in the cited passage that "[tihe
exclusionary quality of a state religion would tend to create and reinforce the existence of' groups that are unusually vulnerable to prejudiced government action. Lupu,
supra, at 743. He develops the point more fully elsewhere in the article:
The most direct and obvious vice that would arise from the establishment
of a national church would be the loss of equal liberty for other religious
groups trying to attract and maintain adherents. A religious establishment supported by government appropriations would possess great competitive advantages over other churches. These advantages could include
the security of material support, and the symbolic and emotional consequences that tend to flow from government endorsement and approval.
An affirmative preference for one religious group would create and reinforce its dominance and would tend to inflict psychic as well as material
injury on the adherents of the nonpreferred faiths.
Id. at 741-42. All of these would be bad results, but they are not the same kind of
injury as that imposed by racial segregation. The inequality of groups, particularly
groups defined by belief, is not the same as the inequality of persons, because the
unequal valuation of beliefs is not logically inconsistent with the equal valuation of
persons. The symbolic and emotional consequences that Lupu describes also ensue
when government discriminates between astronomers and astrologers, but that discrimination does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.
To be fair to Lupu, he does not attempt to conflate equal protection and
nonestablishment in the way that Amar does. Lupu does not need to, because his
theory does not question the incorporation of the Establishment Clause into the Fourteenth Amendment. For an overview, see Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect
Liberty: A General Theory of the Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL Iss. 357
(1996).
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disdaining me."0 Equal citizenship was violated when the government maintained separate schools for whites and blacks,3
but equal citizenship is not violated when the National Science
Foundation provides funding for astronomers but not astrologers. (Unlike the segregation case, there is not even a pretense
that the astrologers get separate but equal funding, but they
still cannot state a constitutional claim.) In short, the equal
protection principle that invalidates the Alabama law is not
applicable to the Utah law.
The difficulty with any attempt to derive the Establishment
Clause from other abstract norms is that the Establishment
Clause is not an application of any larger abstract norm that
can be defined without reference to the specific historical, political, and philosophical properties of religion. The Establishment
Clause stands on its own base. And that means if you do away
with it, you will find it hard to replace it with the doctrinal
materials that are left over.
The upshot is that, if Amar's theory is accepted (and if we
discard his unpersuasive attempt to defend the status quo, an
attempt which is peripheral to his theory and which takes up
only a few pages of his book), the present Establishment Clause
constraints on the states must be abandoned.3 2
There are always two ways to resolve any inconsistency.
Earlier writers who argued against incorporation of the Establishment Clause were willing to tolerate a good deal more sponsorship of religion than Amar is prepared to countenance,
though, revealingly, none of them appear to be enthusiastic
about state-sponsored establishments. 3 If Amar's theory, with

30. I have, on this basis, disagreed with Professor Amar's interpretation of another Supreme Court decision, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). Compare Akhil
Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 MICH. L. REV. 203
(1996), with Koppelman, Invidious Intent, supra note 26, at 119-21.
31. Amar has argued this point in recent defenses of the Court's decision in
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112
HARv. L. REV. 747, 766-73 (1999); Amar, supra note 28, at 79-84.
32. I pass over without comment Amar's earlier attempt to defend one of the
most important establishment holdings, the prohibition on state-sponsored prayers in
public schools. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE
L.J. 1131, 1160 n.140 (1991). The argument there does not appear in the book, and
Professor Amar advises me that he has abandoned it.
33. Porth and George would like to forbid religious establishments, although they
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the corrections noted above, dictates that establishment clause
constraints upon the states be abandoned, then perhaps this is
bad news for those constraints.
But it may instead be bad news for Amar's theory, at least if
that theory is relied upon as a basis for drawing conclusions
about present constitutional law. John Rawls noted long ago
that when we argue about theories of justification, we seek
"reflective equilibrium," in which we try to bring our principles
into line with our considered judgments about justice.' If we
seek a constitutional theory that preserves what is valuable in
existing law, it is probably a mistake to start with principles
that focus on text and original intent to the exclusion of precedent and prudence.
Amar is an admirer of the constitutional theories of Philip
Bobbitt. So am I. Amar has written that Bobbitt's work was
"absolutely formative in my own thinking" about refined incorporation.35 Yet Bobbitt's universe of constitutional arguments
is broader than that of The Bill of Rights. When Amar describes his debt to Bobbitt, he describes Bobbitt's insights into
the interplay of text, history, and structure; but Bobbitt's taxonomy of constitutional arguments also recognizes that there is a
place in constitutional law for doctrine, for ethical argument,
and even for ordinary prudence.' This second half of Bobbitt's
story is missing from Amar's book. It is because this part of the
story is missing that I am, in the end, uncertain whether

think that the present U.S. Constitution does not do this. See Porth & George, supra
note 20, at 164. Smith is more willing to give the states broad freedom from judicial
intervention, so long as there is not some concrete harm to the religious freedom of
some identifiable person or group of persons. But he also thinks that non-establishment is a good thing, and that part of the argument for getting the Court out of this
area is that its involvement is unnecessary: official state establishments were terminated, and prosecutions for blasphemy, heresy, and witchcraft abandoned, without the
Courtes help. See Steven D. Smith, Unprincipled Religious Freedom, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISs. 497, 503 (1996).
34. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 19-20 (1971).
35. Akhil Reed Amar, In Praise of Bobbitt, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1703, 1706 (1994).
36. See PHILIP BOBBFIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION

(1982). For a brief summary, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
11-22 (1991). Amar has acknowledged elsewhere that considerations of this sort may
sometimes override even the plain meaning of the Constitution's text. See AKHIL
REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 153

(1997).
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Amar's theory, if fully stated, has the corrosive implications
that I have just described.
The question that this book never addresses is how much the
theory of incorporation really matters. The selective-incorporation approach that the Court ultimately adopted is intellectually
unsatisfying. But the law is settled; the decisions about which
parts of the Bill of Rights to incorporate were all made by the
early 1970s.' None of these decisions has even come close to
being overruled, and even the most aggressive originalists are
not inclined to challenge them.'
A general problem with originalism, textualism, or any theory
that abstracts from modern constitutional developments since
the Civil War is that it may produce prescriptions that radically disrupt the status quo with no practical payoff other than
greater fidelity to the theory.3 9 Amar's theory, if taken as a
complete theory of incorporation, would give no weight to the
fact that, in some areas, the law is well settled and nobody is
particularly anxious to change it. It would threaten to throw
the law into chaos for no reason other than that that is what
the theory itself dictates. But, as I have said, it is unlikely that
Amar himself would read his theory this way. When his arguments have implied radical prescriptions, he has not been at all
shy about making those implications clear.' There is no such
clarion call in The Bill of Rights. Moreover, he acknowledges
that he is constrained by the textual parameters of his subject
matter: "I aim only to set the scene for future scholarship to
pick up where I have left off."4' So, in the end, I am not sure

37. For a catalogue of the relevant precedents, see MURPHY ET AL., supra note 14,
at 133-34.
38. Thus, for example, Robert Bork has conceded that "as a matter of judicial
practice the issue [of incorporation] is settled," see ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING
OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 94 (1990), and Antonin Scalia
has written that incorporation is "an extension I accept because it is both long established and narrowly limited." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 275 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Both perspectives are cited in David Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 877, 922 n.104.
39. See Thomas W. Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 509
(1996).
40. See generally, e.g., AMAR, supra note 36 (proposing a radical reshaping of an
entire field of the law).
41. AMAR, supra note 2, at 300.
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whether the present essay is a critique of The Bill of Rights or
merely of the implications that some readers, but not the author himself, might draw from the argument.

42. Professor Amar, in his response to this essay, attempts to show that even
symbolic endorsement of religion violates the Free Exercise Clause. His argument depends on asserting the equivalence of the following three laws: (1) a one-penny tax
on all nonCongregationalists; (2) the same tax, imposed on everyone, with a rebate to
Congregationalists; and (3) a one-penny grant to every Congregationalist.
I am not persuaded of the equivalence, and there are analogous areas of constitutional law in which it is clear that the cases are not equivalent. The first law
clearly and intentionally burdens some people for their religious exercise, in the same
way that a one-penny tax on any publication advocating astrology would
impermissibly burden the free speech of astrologers. But the third doesn't seem to
target nonCongregationalists for a burden, and so would seem to be permissible under free exercise principles for the same reason that a subsidy for astronomers does
not violate the free speech rights of astrologers. The Free Speech Clause of the
Constitution does not, as a general matter, prevent the government from speaking, or
from subsidizing speech that it likes.
The second law is a puzzle, resembling that presented to the Supreme Court in
West Lynn Creamery, Ina v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994). In Healy, Massachusettts
taxed all milk sales in the state, and distributed the proceeds as a subsidy to
Massachusetts milk producers. The Court invalidated the scheme because it was the
functional equivalent of a tariff on out-of-state milk which was prohibited under the
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. See id. at 194-95. But there was a puzzle here:
both a tax and a subsidy are, taken by themselves, permissible. Neither the Court
nor the concurring and dissenting opinions suggested that nondiscrimminatory taxes
or discriminatory subsidies were unconstitutional; it was the peculiar combination of
them that was fatal. Similarly, even if Amar's second statute is unconstitutional, that
does not settle the status of the third.
It is not clear, from Amar's brief discussion, how he would handle the problem
presented by subsidies for certain kinds of speech, or the Healy problem. If he is
going to insist on the constitutional equivalence of taxes and subsidies, then he would
seem to be committed to the propositions that (1) states may not subsidize in-state
producers and (2) neither states nor the federal government may pay for speech with
which they agree. After reading the above sentences, Professor Amar has suggested
that the law of nonpolitical speech and of the dormant Commerce Clause each have a
different logic and shape than religion does, and so he is unpersuaded by the force of
these analogies. We will surely continue this conversation in other fora.

